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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 12-3416 
_______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
    
v. 
 
TOMMY LEE CLAYBORN, 
 
        Appellant 
 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal No. 1-05-cr-00051-001) 
District Judge: Hon. William W. Caldwell 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 19, 2013 
 
BEFORE: AMBRO, HARDIMAN and COWEN,  Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion Filed: April 22, 2013) 
 
_______________ 
 
OPINION 
_______________ 
 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
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Tommy Lee Clayborn (“Clayborn”) appeals the order of the District Court denying 
his motion for sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  His counsel filed a brief 
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that no nonfrivilous 
issues exist for appeal and seeking to withdraw as counsel.  We will grant counsel’s 
motion to withdraw and affirm the order of the District Court denying the motion for 
sentence reduction. 
I. 
 The grand jury charged Clayborn with conspiracy to distribute and possession with 
intent to distribute in excess of 50 grams of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 
846, and distribution and possession with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 
841(a)(1).  Clayborn entered into a plea agreement with the government, which provided 
that Clayborn would plead guilty to a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.  The government 
agreed to dismiss the other charge. 
 The plea agreement stipulated to a sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment.  It stated, 
in relevant part: 
Pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
the government and the defendant stipulate and agree to the following 
regarding the defendant’s sentence: Notwithstanding any Guideline 
calculation or prior conviction, the defendant and the United States agree 
that the defendant shall receive a sentence of 20 years imprisonment.  The 
parties agree that this sentence is a reasonable sentence under the facts and 
circumstances of this case. 
 
(App. 27 at ¶ 11.)  The District Court accepted the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement and 
imposed a sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment. 
3 
 
 Subsequently, Clayborn filed a counseled motion to reduce his sentence pursuant 
to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  Clayborn argued that he was eligible for a sentence reduction 
due to Amendment 750 to the Sentencing Guidelines, which reduced the Guideline range 
for crack cocaine offenses.1
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  We exercise  
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review a denial of a motion for sentence 
reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Mateo, 
560 F.3d 152, 154 (3d Cir. 2009). 
  The motion argued that, under the new Guidelines, 
Clayborn’s applicable range would be reduced from 235-240 months to 151-188 months.  
The District Court denied the motion and this appeal followed.  As noted, Clayborn’s 
counsel has filed an Anders brief, asserting that no nonfrivilous issues exist for appeal 
and seeking to withdraw as counsel. 
II. 
In Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), the Supreme Court explained 
the general duties of a lawyer representing an indigent criminal defendant on appeal when 
the lawyer seeks leave to withdraw from continued representation because there are no 
nonfrivolous grounds for appeal.  The attorney must always “support his client’s appeal to 
                                                 
1 Clayborn had previously filed a similar motion to reduce his sentence due to 
amendments to the crack cocaine Sentencing Guidelines, which was denied, and that 
denial was affirmed by this Court.  See United States v. Clayborn, 322 F. App’x 99 (3d. 
Cir. 2009).  The denial was based on this Court’s decision in United States v. Sanchez, 
562 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2009).  Subsequent to that decision, the Supreme Court modified 
Sanchez in Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2685 (2011).  Clayborn asserted in his 
motion that he is entitled to relief under Freeman. 
4 
 
the best of his ability.”  Anders, 386 U.S. at 744.  If, however, “counsel finds his case to 
be wholly frivolous, after a conscientious examination of it, he should so advise the court 
and request permission to withdraw.”  Id. 
Counsel’s request to withdraw must be accompanied by “a brief referring to 
anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal.”  Id.  While the Anders 
rules are “only suggestive, not prescriptive,” the Third Circuit has implemented the 
Anders guidelines through Local Appellate Rule 109.2(a).2
                                                 
2 Local Appellate Rule 109.2(a) states:  
  United States v. Youla, 241 
F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001).  Counsel is required to submit an Anders brief, which must 
“satisfy the court that he or she has thoroughly scoured the record in search of appealable 
issues,” and “explain why the issues are frivolous.”  United States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 
778, 780 (3d Cir. 2000).  This Court, after reviewing the Anders brief, must determine 
“(1) whether counsel adequately fulfills the rule’s requirements; and (2) whether an 
 
Where, upon review of the district court record, counsel is persuaded that 
the appeal presents no issue of even arguable merit, counsel may file a 
motion to withdraw and supporting brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 
386 U.S. 738 (1967), which must be served upon the appellant and the 
United States.  The United States must file a brief in response.  Appellant 
may also file a brief in response pro se.  After all briefs have been filed, the 
clerk will refer the case to a merits panel.  If the panel agrees that the appeal 
is without merit, it will grant counsel’s Anders motion, and dispose of the 
appeal without appointing new counsel.  If the panel finds arguable merit to 
the appeal, or that the Anders brief is inadequate to assist the court in its 
review, it will appoint substitute counsel, order supplemental briefing and 
restore the case to the calendar.  The panel will also determine whether to 
continue the appointment of current counsel or to direct the clerk to 
discharge current counsel and appoint new counsel. 
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independent review of the record presents any nonfrivolous issues.”  Youla, 241 F.3d at 
300. 
III. 
 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) permits the government and a 
defendant to enter into a binding agreement, and a panel of this Court has previously held 
that Clayborn’s agreement was binding.  See United States v. Clayborn, 221 F. App’x 126 
(3d Cir. 2007).  In Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2685 (2011), the Supreme Court 
considered whether a defendant is permitted to move for a reduction of sentence under 18 
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) when the defendant pleads guilty pursuant to a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) 
agreement.  The Freeman Court issued a fractured opinion.  Justice Kennedy wrote for a 
plurality of four justices.  Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion.  Chief Justice 
Roberts wrote a dissenting opinion for four justices.  Under such circumstances, Justice 
Sotomayor’s concurring opinion is the controlling opinion.  See United States v. 
Thompson, 682 F.3d 285, 290 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[B]ecause Justice Sotomayor’s opinion is 
narrower than Justice Kennedy’s, it expresses the holding of the Court.”). 
 In her Freeman opinion, Justice Sotomayor stated that a defendant is not eligible 
for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) unless the text of the defendant’s 
plea agreement “expressly uses a Guidelines sentencing range applicable to the charged 
offense to establish the term of imprisonment.”  Freeman, 131 S. Ct. at 2695.  
Accordingly, if the plea agreement binds the district court to a term of imprisonment—
rather than a range—the imposed sentence “is ‘based on’ the agreement itself, not on the 
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judge’s calculation of the Sentencing Guidelines.”  Id.  If the term of imprisonment is 
“based on the binding agreement” that the parties negotiated pursuant to Rule 
11(c)(1)(C), it cannot be disturbed by a motion for sentence reduction.  Id. at 2697. 
 The dispositive question in this case is whether Clayborn’s Rule 11(c)(1)(C) 
agreement refers to Sentencing Guidelines or whether it reflects an agreement to a 
particular sentence.  The agreement is clear on its face that the parties agreed to a 20 year 
sentence, and that the agreement had no basis in the Sentencing Guidelines.  The 
agreement states, in relevant part: “Notwithstanding any Guideline calculation or prior 
conviction, the defendant and the United States agree that the defendant shall receive a 
sentence of 20 years imprisonment.”  (App. 27 at ¶ 11 (emphasis added).)  As a result of 
the clear language of the agreement, the District Court properly dismissed the motion for 
sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).3
IV. 
   
For the foregoing reasons, we will grant counsel’s motion to withdraw as counsel 
and affirm the order of the District Court denying the motion for sentence reduction.   
                                                 
3 In his motion before the District Court, Clayborn relied on Justice Kennedy’s plurality 
opinion in Freeman.  Clayborn is correct that he would be entitled to move for a reduction 
in sentence if Justice Kennedy’s opinion reflected the holding of the Court.  However, as 
discussed, Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion reflects the Court’s holding. 
